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Abstract
We provide a microfoundation for a weighted utilitarian social welfare func-
tion that reects common moral intuitions about interpersonal comparisons
of utilities. If utility is only ordinal in the usual microeconomic sense, inter-
personal comparisons are meaningless. Nonetheless, economics often adopts
utilitarian welfare functions, assuming that comparable utility functions can
be calibrated using information beyond consumer choice data. We show that
consumer choice data alone are su¢ cient. As suggested by Edgeworth (1881),
just noticeable di¤erences provide a common unit of measure for interper-
sonal comparisons of utility di¤erences. We prove that a simple monotonicity
axiom implies a weighted utilitarian aggregation of preferences, with weights
proportional to individual jnds.
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1 Introduction
All too often, individuals and societies have to make choices between alternatives
that are not Pareto-ranked. Fortunately, in many such problems people seem to
share a moral intuition regarding the interpersonal comparison of utilities involved.
For example, people tend to view progressive taxation as ethically more desirable
than regressive taxation. The reason seems to be that most people would agree that
it is easier for a rich person to give up, say, $100 than it would be for a poor
person (other things being equal). Thus, perhaps judging by introspection, most of
us feel that one can compare utility di¤erences across individuals who di¤er in their
wealth or income.
Moreover, people also appear to have shared moral intuition about interpersonal
comparisons of utilities across individuals who di¤er in their perceived needs. Asked
whether a disabled person should be allocated a reserved parking spot, most would
tend to respond in the a¢ rmative. Similarly, many people would agree that on a
crowded bus, a healthy young person should o¤er their seat to an elderly passenger
or a pregnant woman, and not vice versa. When boarding airplanes, airlines give
priority to families with young children, allowing them to avoid long lines. The
underlying reasoning seems to be that the scarce resource being allocated matters
moreto some individuals than to others. Using remote parking is a smaller burden
for a non-disabled person. Standing on a bus is easier for a younger person. Waiting
in line is less exhausting for adult passengers.
However, this intuitive notion of utility as a measure of well-being that can be
compared across individuals is at odds with the foundation of microeconomic theory.
Microeconomics textbooks typically warn the student that utility functions are but
mathematical artefacts used to represent preferences. They are shown to be only
ordinal and it is emphasised that no particular meaning should be attached to their
values or to di¤erences thereof. Importantly, in a typical microeconomics course it
is considered meaningless to ask which of two individuals would value a good more,
whether ones sacrice is worth the others benet, and so forth.
The above notwithstanding, the elds of public economics and social choice have
been using social welfare functions, taking individual utility values as arguments, and
assuming that these values are meaningful beyond the mere ordering of alternatives
for each individual separately. In particular, it is common in economic models to
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adopt a utilitarian social welfare function and use a (weighted or unweighted) sum of
individuals utilities to formalise a social planners objective.1 Examples range from
mechanism design (see Borgers, Krahmer and Strausz 2015) to optimal taxation (see
Saez and Stantcheva, 2016) and climate change discussions (see Stanton, 2011).
How does social choice theory bridge the gap between the merely-ordinal utility
function of consumer theory and the cardinal one needed for much of public eco-
nomics? One approach follows Harsanyi (1955) in assuming an impartial observer
who has preferences that are separate from the individuals. Such an impartial ob-
server would feel that it is easier for the rich to give up income than for the poor, that
the frail should get priority seating in public transportation, and so forth. Another
approach employs preferences under risk to calibrate individualscardinal utilities,
and use them in a social choice function (see Harsanyi, 1953, Dhillon and Mertens,
1999, Segal, 2000, Fleurbaey and Mongin, 2016).
While these approaches have their merits, they implicitly agree with the claim
that consumer choice data alone do not provide scientic, empirical grounds for
interpersonal comparisons of utility.2 If one believes that economists should only
rely on revealed preferences and choice data, or even on choice data that are in
principle observable, the above seems to imply that they should not engage in any
normative statements that require interpersonal comparisons of utility.
Our paper points out that this perception is false, because actual consumer
choice data, even under certainty, contain much more information than the idealised
classroom model assumes. In particular, they contain information that makes it
possible, at least in principle, to compare utility di¤erences across individuals on
a scientic basis. Moreover, these comparisons are in line with the common moral
intuitions illustrated in the examples we started out with.
1See dAspremont and Gevers (2002) and Mongin and dAspremont (1998).
2Sen (1977) and Roberts (1980) classify the di¤erent levels of measurability and comparability
of utility levels by the degrees of uniqueness of the individual utility functions that each of them
requires. Based on their classication, there seems to be a general perception that the assumptions
on observables needed for to make interpersonal comparisons and the use of social welfare functions
meaningful are rather demanding and largely divorced from the revealed preference paradigm.
For example, Myles (2008) writes (p. 54), Among these alternative degrees of comparability,
only ONC [Ordinality and Non-Comparability] and CNC [Cardinality and Non-Comparability]
are formally justied by representation theorems on preferences. Moving further down the list
[including CUC, Cardinal Unit Comparability, i.e. comparability of gains and losses] requires an
increasing degree of pure faith that the procedure is justied.
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Psychological research shows that choice data exhibit limited discernibility3: in-
dividuals cannot perceive very small di¤erences, and have a positive just-noticeable-
di¤erence (jnd). It follows that indi¤erence is typically an intransitive relation and
that consumer choice is more realistically modelled by semi-orders, allowing to cap-
ture the fact that close quantities cannot be discerned, than by weak orders, which
assume perfect discernibility between any two distinct levels of utility4.5 A con-
sumer choice model with semi-ordered rather than weak-ordered preferences is
not only more realistic, but it also allows for the comparison of utility di¤erences
across individuals.
As early as in 1881, Edgeworth suggested to operationalise Benthams (1780)
utilitarianism using jnds. This idea was supported by an axiomatic derivation in
Ng (1975). The purpose of the present paper is to contribute to this debate by a
di¤erent axiomatic derivation of Edgeworths proposal. Our model and result di¤er
from Ngs in many ways, and we devote the bulk of Section 5 to a discussion of
the two. While the results are mathematically independent, we nd our axioms
signicantly easier to accept, and hope that so will some readers.
The basis for Edgeworths proposal is the observation that cross-individual com-
parisons of utility di¤erences based on the notion of a jnd capture the common
moral intuition in many problems of interest. The intuitive notion that a disabled
person needs a parking spot morethan a healthy one can be captured by jnds:
the former is likely to notice every 100 meters to be crossed, and every step to be
climbed, while these might be unnoticeable by the latter. Similarly, in the example
of taxation, the vague sense that it is easierfor the rich to part with $100 than it
is for the poor corresponds to the assumption that, at higher levels of income, the
same sum of $100 buys less jndsthan it does at lower levels.
Importantly, we point out that the jnd calculus does not require (or imply) that
one would consider absolute levels of utility comparable across individuals. Luckily,
3There are many possible sources of data that would be considered observable by psychologists,
and that are ignored by the idealised model of consumer theory, including response times, neuro-
logical imaging, etc. However, the main point of this paper is that one need not add new types of
data to make the consumer model more informative than it appears to be in textbooks.
4The notion of a just-noticeable-di¤erences (jnd) was introduced and studied by Weber (1834).
Luce (1956) suggested to use it as a guideline for the development of consumer theory.
5Observe that this means that the standard microeconomics textbook does not only ignore
types of data that might exist in reality; it also makes incorrect assumptions about the data it
does recognise.
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making (weighted) utilitarianism operational does not resort to such comparisons
either. There is no need to assume that miseryor blissmean the same thing
to di¤erent people. Only the di¤erences in utilities need to be comparable, and for
that jnds su¢ ce.
Our main contribution is a formal result showing that aggregation of preferences
through weighted utilitarianism follows from a very simple axiom. The axiom, which
in the context of transitive indi¤erence means nothing but monotonicity, will be
shown to simultaneously imply the additively separable structure of utilitarianism,
and to select individual weights that reect peoples sensitivities.
While jnd calculus appears intuitive in some examples, it can appear counter-
intuitive in others. In particular, some examples call for a richer model, in which
time and uncertainty are formally modelled. We briey describe such an example
in Section 4.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 illustrates how semi-orders provide
a foundation for comparable cardinal utility functions. Section 3 presents the main
result of this paper, an axiomatic characterisation of weighted utilitarianism. Section
4 describes an example of an extension of the model. Section 5 discusses the related
literature. Section 6 concludes.
2 Intransitive indi¤erence and interpersonal com-
parisons
2.1 Semi-orders and cardinality
The textbook microeconomic model assumes that preferences are a weak order: a
complete and transitive binary relation over alternatives. It follows that a utility
function representing such a relation is not unique. It can be replaced by any
strictly increasing monotone transformation thereof, without changing the implied
preferences. Hence, utility has only ordinal meaning and interpersonal comparisons
of utility are meaningless. This conclusion relies on the unrealistic assumption that
indi¤erence is transitive.
In reality, choices systematically deviate from transitivity of indi¤erence, due to
the limited accuracy of human perception6. In the 19th century, the eld of psy-
6See also Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), p. 7.
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chophysiology observed that a person who is exposed to a physical stimulus would
not always notice small changes in it. For example, given two similar masses, a
person may not be able to tell which one is larger. Fixing a certain threshold for the
probability of identifying the larger quantity (typically 75% in psychological exper-
iments), the just-noticeable-di¤erence (jnd) is the minimal increase in the stimulus
size that is discernible with probability at the threshold or higher.
Luce (1956) used this observation to rene the model of consumer choice. In a
famous example, he argued that one cannot claim to have strict preferences between
a cup of co¤ee without sugar and the same cup with a single grain of sugar added to
it. Due to the inability to discern the two, an individual would have to be considered
indi¤erent between them. Similarly, the same individual would most likely be hard
pressed to tell which of two cups contains one grain of sugar and which contains
two. Indeed, it stands to reason that for small enough grains, an individual would be
indi¤erent between a cup with n grains and one with (n+ 1) grains of sugar for every
n. If transitivity of preferences were to hold, then, by transitivity of indi¤erence, the
individual would be indi¤erent to the amount of sugar in her co¤ee cup, a conclusion
that is obviously false for most individuals. Clearly, the same can be said of any set
of alternatives that contain su¢ ciently close quantities.
Luce (1956) axiomatically dened binary relations, dubbed semi-orders, that
allow for some types of intransitive indi¤erences. For the sake of the present dis-
cussion, it su¢ ces to say that a semi-order  is an irreexive binary relation 
(interpreted as strict preference) that can be represented by a utility function u and
a threshold  > 0 (the utility jnd) such that, for any two alternatives x; y:
x  y iff u(x)  u(y) > :
In words, strict preference emerges for one alternative over another only if the utility
di¤erence between them is above the threshold.
A fundamental feature of Luces model is that utility functions that represent
semi-orders are not ordinal; they are almost unique, hence carry a cardinal mean-
ing. They are almost unique in the following sense: if another function, v, represents
 as above (with the same  > 0), u and v have to agree on  di¤erences. That is,
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whenever u increases by , so should v.7 More generally, whenever u increases by k
for any positive integer k, so should v. For any two alternatives x; y, the functions
u; v have to agree not only on the ordinal ranking but also on the number of 
stepsbetween them, which therefore provides a cardinal measure of the intensity
of preferences. Consider, for example, three alternatives x  y  z such that the
following holds:
4 < u (x)  u (y)  5
 < u (y)  u (z)  2.
For any function v representing the same preferences with the same , the following
must also hold:
4 < v (x)  v (y)  5
 < v (y)  v (z)  2.
Therefore, for a given consumer it is meaningful to say that x is better than y by
more than y is better than zbecause the utility jnd provides a scale that is not
a¤ected by the choice of utility function8.
Observe that jnds are dened by a probability threshold, which is typically
taken to be 75%, but can be varied. Thus, one can have a di¤erent binary order p
for each probability p 2 [0:5; 1] and assume that each is a semi-order, obtaining a
nested family of semi-orders (see Roberts, 1971). Alternatively, one can retain the
probabilistic information in its entirety, rather than distinguishing between higher
than pversus lower than p, resulting in models of stochastic choice.9 The main
point, however, is that even if one restricts attention to commonly-dened jnds,
actual choice data already contain enough information to pin down an almost-unique
utility function.
7Under some richness conditions, one can show that, if both u and v represent the semiorder
 as above, then there is an increasing function f such that v = f(u), and that, for any a,
f(a+ ) = f(a) + .
8The utility representation is almost unique, rather than unique, because for any v and u
representing , with v = f (u), the function f can be any arbitrary strictly increasing function
over the [0; ] interval, as long as f ()  f (0) = .
9See Luce (1958), and, more recently, Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) and many others.
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2.2 Interpersonal comparisons of utility
A key step in our analysis is the observation that Luces model makes interper-
sonal comparisons of utility meaningful. Denote by x; y; ::: social alternatives such
as consumption allocations, and assume that each individual i has semi-ordered
preferences i over them, represented by
x i y iff ui(x)  ui(y) > i > 0.
We have seen in section 2.1 that, given i, the representation of a preference order
i by a function ui is almost unique. We further notice that a representation by
(ui; i) can be replaced by (aui; ai) for any a > 0. Without loss of generality, we
may select i = 1, that is, replace (ui; i) by (uii ; 1).
Jnds therefore provide a way of comparing utility di¤erences across individuals,
based on choice data alone. For example, if, for two social alternatives x; y, and two
individuals i = 1; 2, we have
u1(x)  u1(y) = 21
u2(x)  u2(y) =  2
it makes sense to say that individual 1 prefers x to y more than individual 2 prefers
y to x. This statement does not mean that the society f1; 2g should prefer x to y.
One can easily come up with SWFs, additive or not, that would put more weight on
u2 than on u1, so that they would rank y above x. The main point is, however, that
such comparisons are meaningful without assuming additional data. Individuals
choice data su¢ ce, in principle, to observe (ui; i) for all individuals involved, and
to endow empirical meaning to comparisons of strength of preferences. In the next
section we introduce an axiom that would equate the importance of jnds of di¤erent
individuals. It will turn out to be the case that this axiom would also imply the
additive structure of the SWF.
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3 Consistency and weighted utilitarianism
The fact that semi-ordered preferences make interpersonal comparisons of utility
meaningful provides a justication for the use of BergsonSamuelson social welfare
functions by a social planner. The next step of our analysis is to provide an ax-
iomatic foundation for a specic social welfare function, that we believe is being
implicitly used in the examples discussed in the introduction. Assuming that indi-
vidual preferences are semi-orders, we investigate what kind of social preferences
are consistent with the use of a weighted utilitarian function in which the weight of
an individual is the inverse of his jnd. We nd that this social welfare criterion is
equivalent to assuming that social preferences satisfy a simple form of monotonic-
ity with respect to individual preferences, that we label Consistency. We will rst
present our result, then discuss the implications of the axiom.
The result reported here was inspired by the proof of the main result in Rubin-
stein (1988), and it is similar to a result in Gilboa and Lapson (1990).10
Consider an economy with a set of individuals N = f1; : : : ; ng. There are l  1
goods. Some mathematical details can be simplied if we restrict attention to strictly
positive quantities, that is to bundles in Rl++. Assume that individual is preferences
are a semi-order i on Rl++. Let^i be the reexive and symmetric relation dened
by the absence of  in either direction (that is, x ^i y if neither x i y nor y i x).
Assume that i is represented by (ui; i) as follows: for every xi; yi 2 Rl++,
xi i yi iff ui(xi)  ui(yi) > i (1)
xi ^i yi iff jui(xi)  ui(yi)j  i
We assume that ui is weakly monotone and continuous, and that i > 0. We
will also assume that, for each i, i is unbounded : for every xi 2 Rl++, there exist
yi; zi 2 Rl++ such that yi i xi i zi. The representation (1) implies that ui is
unbounded, and its continuity implies that image (ui) = R.
10Rubinstein (1988) dealt with procedures for choices under risk. While his monotonicity con-
dition cannot apply in the current set-up, his proof relies on an insight that proved useful also
in Gilboa and Lapson (1990). The latter contained two interpretations of a main result, one for
decision under uncertainty and one for social choice. In the published version (1995) only the
former appeared. The result presented here di¤ers from those of Gilboa and Lapson (1990, 1995)
in a number of mathematical details.
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An allocation is an assignment of bundles to individuals,
x = (x1; :::; xn) 2 X 
 
Rl++
n
:
Assume that society has semi-ordered11 preferences 0 on the set of allocations 
Rl++
n
that is represented by (u0; 0) with 0 > 0. Thus, u0 :
 
Rl++
n ! R is such
that, for every x; y 2  Rl++n,
x 0 y iff u0(x)  u0(y) > 0 (2)
x ^0 y iff ju0(x)  u0(y)j  0
We similarly assume that u0 is continuous.
For z 2 X and xi 2 Rl+ we denote by (z i; xi) 2 X the allocation obtained by
replacing the i-th component of z, zi, by xi. The axiom we will use to characterise
weighted utilitarianism is
Consistency: For every i, every z 2 X and every xi; yi 2 Rl++,
(z i; xi) 0 (z i; yi) iff xi i yi.
First, observe that if all jnds were zero, Consistency would boil down to simple
monotonicity of societys preferences with respect to the individuals: if all individ-
ualsbundles apart from i stay xed, society adopts is preferences.12
In the presence of semi-ordered preferences, Consistency still states that if we
focus on an individual i, and hold all other individualsbundles xed, societys pref-
erences are those of the individual. In case individual i expresses strict preference,
say xi i yi, society agrees with that individual. Similarly, if individual i cannot
tell the di¤erence between xi and yi, the di¤erence between the two is immaterial
to society as well.
Notice that Consistency is restricted to the case that no individual j 6= i is
a¤ected at all, whether she can tell the di¤erence or not, i.e., that z i is kept
exactly constant when comparing (z i; yi) to (z i; xi). Importantly, Consistency
11We will discuss the implications of assuming that social preferences are given by a standard
weak order at the end of this section.
12See also Fleming (1952), who derives a utilitarian aggregation in the context of standard
preferences, assuming the trade-o¤ between any pair of individuals is independent of the others.
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does not require that society agrees with is preferences as long as this individual is
the only one to express strict preference, while the others might be a¤ected by the
choice in a way they cannot discern. For example, consider a suggestion that each
individual j 6= i contribute 1 cent to i. Assume that 1 cent is a small enough quantity
for each j 6= i not to notice it. By contrast, the accumulation of these cents can
render i rich. Consistency does not imply that society prefers this donation scheme.
Indeed, requiring this implication would lead to intransitivities (as one can change
the happy recipient of the individually-negligible donations and generate cycles of
strict societal preferences). Beyond intransitivity, such a version of the axiom does
not seem well t to capture social preferences with which people would agree. In the
example above, the two bundles di¤er for all consumers. Individual i can tell the
di¤erence between the alternatives, while the individuals who lose one cent cannot.
Yet, such a donation scheme has a feeling of deception, involving as it were ne
print which is unnoticeable at a given time but may prove noticeable in the long
run. Thus, such a donation scheme might not capture common moral sentiments.
Importantly, Consistency does not resort to such schemes. It only applies when the
bundles of all the individuals, but one, are una¤ected.
For the statement of the main result we need the following denition: a jnd-grid
of allocations is a collection A  X such that, for every x; y 2 A and every i 2 N ,
ui (xi)  ui (yi) = kii for some ki 2 Z
Thus, a jnd-grid is a countable subset of allocations, such that the utility di¤erences
between any two elements thereof, for any individual, is an integer multiple of that
individuals jnd.
We can now state
Theorem 1 Let there be given (i)i2N ; ((ui; i))i2N , 0 and (u0; 0) as above. Con-
sistency holds i¤ there exists a strictly monotone, continuous
g : Rn ! R
such that for every x 2 X
u0 (x) = g (u1 (x1) ; :::; un (xn))
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and, for every jnd-grid A  X there exists c 2 R such that, for every x 2 A,
u0 (x) = c+
nX
i=1
0
i
ui (xi) (3)
The theorem states that, should societys preferences satisfy Consistency with
respect to the individualspreferences, the former should basically be represented
by a weighted (utilitarian) summation of the individualsutilities, where the weights
are the inverse of the just noticeable di¤erences. This is the version of utilitarianism
rst suggested by Edgeworth (1881, p. 60) , who wrote, Just perceivable increments
of pleasure, of all pleasures for all persons, are equateable.In fact, given individual
preferences i represented by (ui; i), the social welfare function (3) considers the
equivalent representation

ui
i
; 0

, in which jnds have been equated, and gives equal
weights to all individuals.
We now discuss in more detail the implications of the Consistency axiom. The
if part of the axiom is a rather natural form of monotonicity. Consider two
allocations (z i; xi) and (z i; yi). In case individual i expresses strict preference, say
xi i yi, there seems to be no reason for society not to agree with that individual,
as no one else is a¤ected by the choice.
The only ifpart of the axiom is more interesting. It states that society is no
more sensitive than the individual herself. If individual i cannot tell the di¤erence
between xi and yi, the di¤erence between the two is immaterial to society as well.
A useful way to think about this is to interpret x i ^i yi and x ^0 y as too close
to be worth worrying about.13 If it is the case that only one individual is allotted
a di¤erent bundle under x as compared to y, and this individual doesnt nd the
di¤erence of signicance, it seems reasonable that neither would society. Notice that
this rules out the possibility that social preferences are given by a standard weak
order instead of a semi-order.
The implications of the only if part of the axiom on the characterisation is
twofold. First, it implies that individuals should be compared by their jnds. Sec-
ond, and probably more surprisingly, it implies the additive structure of the welfare
function. One need not assume a utilitarian function as did Bentham one obtains it
from the axiom. Without the only ifpart of the axiom, many more social welfare
13Rounding o¤ tax returns to the closest integer amount may be considered an example in which
some di¤erences are considered to be below the jnd for a particular individual and for society.
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functions would represent social preferences 0. For example, one could consider a
vector of positive weights  = (i)i and dene the social welfare function
u0 (x) = c+
nX
i=1
i0
i
ui (xi) :
For any weights i  1, the preferences dened by this function would satisfy the
ifpart of Consistency, but u0 would allow a variety of weights of the individuals.
Most importantly, functional forms that are not additively separable would also be
compatible with this weaker version of the axiom.
One may replace the only ifpart of the axiom by assuming that social pref-
erences are given by a weak order, and add an anonymitycondition, stating that
if one individuals bundle can be replaced by another bundle that is precisely one
jnd better for that individual, society is indi¤erent regarding the identity of the
individual. Indeed, the fact that for weak-ordered social preferences Consistency is
stated as an if and only if condition implicitly requires that society treat the jnds
of di¤erent individuals equally. However, the axiom does not explicitly refer to more
than one jnd, and or to separability across individuals. It is a result of the theorem
that, with semi-ordered preferences for the individuals, this axiom su¢ ces to derive
additive separability across individuals.
We claim that the welfare function axiomatised in Theorem 1, where an individ-
uals weight is the inverse of their jnd, captures the common moral feeling underlying
the examples in the introduction. Giving a higher weight to a person with a smaller
jnd means being more likely to allocate a good to someone for whom it creates more
jnds. That it, to the person to whom it matters more, which is what most peo-
ple would agree should be done when, for example, choosing whether to allocate a
parking spot to a disabled or a non-disabled driver, a priority seating for the aged,
and so forth. Importantly, this comparison is made based on the jnds calculus. One
surely needs to make some assumptions about the comparisons of di¤erent individ-
uals jnds as in the Consistency axiom but one need not add new sources of
information, such as a central planners order over social alternatives.
Similarly, the Edgeworth version of weighted utilitarianism seems to capture
the social preferences underlying commonly shared ethical opinions about taxation.
People tend to view progressive taxation as ethically more desirable than, say, re-
gressive taxation, because they feel that it is easier for a rich person to pay a
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given amount, than it would be for a poor person (other things being equal). This
is normally explained by arguing that the marginal utility of money is decreasing.
In Luces model, one can provide empirical meaning to such a claim. Suppose that
the alternatives are real-valued, denoting the cost (say, in dollars) of a bundle one
may consume a day. The value 0 denotes destitution, implying starvation. The
value 1 allows one to consume a loaf of bread, clearly a very noticeable di¤erence.
In fact, even the value 0:1, denoting the amount of bread one can buy for 10 cents,
is noticeably di¤erent from 0 for a starving person. However, when ones daily con-
sumption is a bundle that costs $500, it is unlikely that a bundle that costs $501
would make a large enough di¤erence to be noticed. Thus, when starting at 0, the
rst dollar makes a noticeable di¤erence, but the 500th does not. More generally,
there probably are more jnds between the bundle bought at $100 and the empty
bundle than there are between the bundle bought at $200 and the former; that is,
the second $100 buys one less jnds than the rst $100.
Observe that, using our result, the common moral intuition that supports pro-
gressive taxation need not be introduced as an additional assumption about com-
parisons of di¤erent individualsutility functions; rather, it can follow from using
jnds as the unit of measurement. We need not ask general ethical questions along
the lines of is alternative x more just than y?. Rather, if we adopt the Consistency
axiom, which can be viewed as one person, one jnd, we need only ask how jnds
behave. This is a question about peoples psychology, and it can have, in principle,
an objective, scientic answer. Using the one person, one jndprinciple and known
ndings about human perception we can derive as conclusions moral judgments that
are often stated as assumptions.
Note that the theorem provides the additive structure only over a grid, and in
the regions between grid points the function g is only guaranteed to be monotone
and continuous. Should one wish to obtain a function g that is linear throughout
the space, one may consider a chain of semi-orders, for each individual as well as
for society, each being a renement of the previous one. For example, as in Roberts
(1971), we may assume that for each threshold probability p 2 [0:5; 1] there is a
semi-order i;p (for i = 0; :::; n), represented by ui and i;p, where i;p is increasing
in p (that is, to obtain a higher probability of discernment one needs to increase the
di¤erence in utility values). It seems natural to assume that, as p ! 0:5 (chance
level), i;p ! 0. Such a nested chain of semi-orders for each individual and for society
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can be represented, as in the theorem above, by an additive formula, where the grid
becomes ner as i;p decreases, and, in the limit i;p ! 0, becomes a dense set in
the domain of g. Coupled with monotonicity, this would imply that g is everywhere
additive. However, such an exercise would require both (i) the Consistency axiom
for every p 2 [0:5; 1]; and (ii) additional axioms to relate the functions that represent
i;p for di¤erent values of p.
4 Time and Endogeneity
In contrast to the examples discussed above, there are others in which using peoples
sensitivities as a measure of their importance, so to speak, strikes most of us as
counter-intuitive if not blatantly outrageous. For example, assume that we need to
divide two bottles of wine between two individuals. The wines di¤er in their quality,
one being exquisite according to wine experts, and the other not. It so happens that
the individuals also di¤er: one of them is a wine connoisseur and the other isnt.
The connoisseur sees many jnds between the wines, while the layperson doesnt.
Thus, Edgeworth solution would be to give the better wine to the expert and let
the layperson make do with the lesser wine.
The reason that the Edgeworth solution appears unfair in the wine example is
that, in the back of our minds, we believe that the layperson can also be educated
and develop a more rened taste. Worse still, such education would typically require
consumption. It thus appears as if Edgeworths suggestion allows the connoisseur,
who might have developed rened tastes through consumption thanks to being rich,
will be allowed to consume more of the good wine than the poor, who has not had
a chance to consume and learn to appreciate quality.
The possibility that taste might change, becoming more or less rened, calls
for a more elaborate model. Consider the wine example, with two goods and two
periods. There are two individuals, i = 1; 2, each of whom consumes, at time t = 1; 2,
quantity xti of the lower quantity wine and quantity w
t
i of the higher quantity wine.
Assume that individual is preferences are represented by (ui; 1), with
ui
 
x1i ; w
1
i ; x
2
i ; w
2
i

= log
 
1 + x1i

+ Ai log
 
1 + w1i

+ log
 
1 + x2i

+
h
Ai +Bi

1  e w1i
i
log
 
1 + w2i

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with the following interpretation: both individuals derive the same utility from the
lower quality wine, log (1 + x), in both periods.14 As for the higher quality one, they
each begin with a level of sensitivity Ai  0, so that the quantity of high quality
wine each of them consumes generates more jnds the higher is Ai.
Note that if there were only one period t = 1, the individual with the higher
sensitivity would indeed be allocated a higher quantity of the high quality wine.
However, the utility at time t = 2 depends also on the consumption at time t = 1: the
individuals are assumed to rene their taste as a result of consumption, where Bi  0
is interpreted as individual is ability to acquire taste. With no past consumption,
w1i = 0, individual i is left with her initial sensitivity Ai, but as her past consumption
grows her sensitivity increases as well (converging to Ai + Bi as w1i ! 1). In this
case, maximisation of the utilitarian social welfare function would require that the
less sensitive individual consume some of the high quality wine already in the rst
period, so that in the second period she can contributemore jnds to the SWF.
That is, it is worth investing in rening individual is taste, even at the cost of
reducing the current jnds experienced by individual j 6= i, so that in the next
period society would have two jnd-producing engines rather than one. Clearly,
the argument will be stronger the more period await the individuals in the future,
that is, if we allow T > 2 periods.15
Along similar lines, one may add to the model several states of the world, allowing
for the possibility that there is uncertainty about acquiring taste. For example, it is
possible that only a certain percentage of children would acquire a taste for certain
types of consumption (say, forms of art). Still, the jnds that these children will
accumulate throughout their lifetime might justify the investment of resources (a
net loss of jnds) at present. Thus, the model presented above is highly idealised.
In many examples one would need to extend it to multiple periods and multiple
states of the world. When these are taken into account, it doesnt strike us as
counter-intuitive to suggest that society collectjnds across individuals, periods,
and states.
14Note that we normalised each (ui; i) so that the weights of the individuals in the SWF are
identical; that is, the Bentham-Edgeworth suggestion is to maximise u1 + u2, and this would be
the conclusion of our theorem on jnd-grids as well.
15One may also extend the model to the past, arguing the individual di¤erences in the coe¢ cients
Ai are themselves a result of past consumption rather than innate.
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5 Related Literature
5.1 Other data sources
The bulk of the literature in public economics and in social choice theory, when
in need of a social welfare function, tends to assume that such a function is sim-
ply given, or that it is derived from observables that go beyond individual choice.
For example, Harsanyis impartial observer (Harsanyi, 1955) is assumed to have
preferences that are separate from the individuals. We have no quarrel with this
assumption on philosophical grounds. However, methodologically it appears to in-
troduce a gap between the standard microeconomic foundations of consumer theory
and social choice. Our main point is that this apparent gap can be bridged simply
be recognising that actual preferences are more informative than normally assumed.
Indeed, the impartial observers preferences may well be consistent with our jnd
calculus, and we hold that in many examples they are.
Another approach suggests pinning down a cardinal utility function for each
individual based on their preferences under risk, and then using these functions, with
some normalisation, for the social welfare function (see Harsanyi (1953), Dhillon and
Mertens (1999), Fleurbaey and Mongin (2016), Fleurbaey and Zuber (2017)). We
do not discuss here the philosophical underpinnings of this approach.16 Segal (2000)
proposes (and axiomatically derives) a weighted utilitarian solution in which, when
evaluating an alternative, each individual is assigned a weight which is inversely
proportional to that individuals gain in von Neumann-Morgenstern utility that this
alternative promises, relative to a benchmark. While this solution di¤ers from the
one discussed here in several way, both mathematical and conceptual, the two share
a fundamental intuition, according to which the less fortunate should have a higher
weight in the social welfare function.
The main point of the present paper is that one need not add information to the
consumer model (such as preferences over lotteries) in order to render utilitarianism
meaningful. In fact, all that one needs to do is to be somewhat more realistic about
the data that consumer choices actually o¤er. It is possible to go much further
than jnds, and to introduce into the model probabilities of choice (beyond the 75%
probability threshold); response time; self-report; brain activity; etc. While these
16These include, inter alia, the introduction of risk attitudes into the ethical discussion and the
additional assumptions about the range of the utility values of each individual.
17
additional sources of data can be introduced, they are not necessary in order to
bridge the gap between microeconomics textbook and economic practice.
5.2 Ng (1975)
We now turn to explain what we view as the marginal contribution of our paper
relative to Ng (1975), which provides a di¤erent axiomatic derivation of a utilitarian
welfare function with utility weights given by the inverse of jnds. The key di¤er-
ence between the two derivations is in the main assumption: the Majority Weak
Preference (MWP) Criterionin Ng (1975) and Consistencyabove. MWP states
that, if there is a weak majority of individuals who strictly prefer one alternative
over another, while no individual has the opposite preference, society should respect
the majority preference. Several related points emerge in comparing the axioms:
a. The MWP axiom involves counting individuals. The theorem shows that
adding up individuals in each of two sets (those who prefer an alternative x to y
and those who dont) eventually leads to adding up the utilities of the individuals.
This is far from trivial, but from a conceptual viewpoint it feels as if addition is
explicitly assumed.
b. The MWP axiom involves counting by size of the utility di¤erence. To identify
the two sets of individuals to be counted (those who prefer an alternative x to y and
those who dont), the axiom requires to count how many utility di¤erences are above
the individual jnd and how many are below it17 and thus the intuition behind the
axiom seems to directly appeal to the additive form we would like to derive.
c. The MWP axiom allows society to penalise an individual in a way that favours
others, as long as this is unnoticeable by the individual. Suppose there are only two
individuals, and consider a donation scheme similar to the one we discussed in section
3: one cent is transferred from j to i. Assume this makes a noticeable di¤erence
for i, but not for j. The MWP axiom implies that society should approve such a
transfer, because one jnd is being gained and none is being lost. As we discussed in
section 3, such a transfer involves a feeling of deception, and assuming that society
approves it might not capture common moral sentiments.
In comparison to MWP, the Consistency axiom (i) makes no summation over
individuals (ii) makes no implicit additions of utility di¤erences; (iii) does not involve
17Indeed, without this restriction the axiom would lead to cycles of strict preferences.
18
reducing peoples underlying utility functions in unnoticeable ways. The assumption
that societys jnd on each axis is equal to that of the individual in question does
indeed make an implicit comparison of jnds, saying that increasing one individuals
underlying utility by one jnd is equivalent to doing this with anothers. But no
counting of individuals is involved; no comparisons of sets of di¤erences (that is,
counting how many are below and how many are above their jnd); and no cheating
in terms of shaving o¤unnoticeable utility di¤erences from some individuals.
Several further di¤erences between our model and Ngs (1975) exist, but they
are rather minor, and may not be worth dwelling upon. These include:
Ng assumes that the Social Welfare Function (SWF) W is quasi-convex or
quasi-concave as a function of the individual utilities, Ui, while we make no such
assumption. The condition is needed in Ngs theorem only to solve the problem that
the SWF can be nonlinear in the small, namely to behave in weird ways within
boxesdened by one jnd per individual. We solve this problem by discussing only
jnd-grids.
Ng assumes that the SWF W is a function of the individual utility functions,
Uis, and that this function is continuous and di¤erentiable. We deduce that W is a
continuous function of the Uis as a result of the Consistency axiom, and continuity of
W with respect to the underlying allocations as one would expect of a monotonicity
condition and we dont need di¤erentiability.
The current paper assumes that society has a semi-order, rather than a stan-
dard weak order. As mentioned above, this can be modied, but at the cost of an
additional assumption, saying that, starting with two equivalent allocations, increas-
ing one of two individualsutility by their jnd results in two equivalent allocations
as well.
6 Conclusions
The main conceptual message of our paper is that one need not have additional
sources of data beyond choice data to make the interpersonal comparison of utility
di¤erences meaningful. In fact, scholars who wish to adhere to the revealed prefer-
ence paradigm as strictly as possible will nd that choice data provide evidence of
intransitive indi¤erence.
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Despite Ngs (1975) contribution, this point seems to be generally ignored. As
cited above, Myles writes (2008, p. 54), Among these alternative degrees of com-
parability, only ONC [Ordinality and Non-Comparability] and CNC [Cardinality
and Non-Comparability] are formally justied by representation theorems on pref-
erences. Moving further down the list [including CUC, Cardinal Unit Comparability,
i.e. comparability of gains and losses] requires an increasing degree of pure faith that
the procedure is justied.
One can only speculate about the reasons that this point hasnt been accepted
by the profession following Edgeworth (1881) and Ng (1975). Edgeworths proposal
was made, perhaps, too early, as it predated the adoption of the revealed preference
paradigm by several decades. Ng (1975), by contrast, relies on semi-orders and cites
their observable foundations. However, Ng (1975, and in other publications) was
willing to make interpersonal comparisons of absolute utility levels as well (see his
discussion on p. 558, second paragraph, beginning with The only logical. . . ). In
particular, Ng is willing to compare absolute bliss or absolute misery across
individuals. Many economists might be wary of such comparisons, as individuals
personal experiences or religious beliefs might di¤erently colour the meaning of such
concepts to them.
It is possible that these interpersonal comparisons of absolute levels of utility
beclouded the point that we nd essential: the claim that Cardinal Unit Compar-
isons are divorced from empirical data is only true within the highly idealised model
of economics textbook. In reality no additional information beyond choice data are
needed to make such comparisons.
Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1
First, assume Consistency. Some of the arguments until and including Claim 7 are
rather standard, and similar arguments appear in the literature (see, for instance,
Blackorby, Primont, and Russell, 1978, and Fleurbaey and Mongin, 2016). Yet, we
have not found references that are su¢ ciently close to our set-up to cite without
proof, and we provide the proofs for completeness.
Claim 1: For every z 2 X and every i  n, we have image (u0 (z i; )) = R.
Proof: Fixing i and z i, Consistency implies that the social preference 0 is
dictated by i. Hence it is unbounded: for every xi 2 Rl++ there are yi; wi 2 Rl++
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such that (z i; yi) 0 (z i; xi) 0 (z i; wi). This implies that image (u0 (z i; )) is
unbounded (from below and from above). Given that u0 is continuous, its range is
also convex, and image (u0 (z i; )) = R follows. 
Claim 2: For every z 2 X, every i  n, and every xi; yi 2 Rl++, if ui (xi) 
ui (yi), then u0 (z i; xi)  u0 (z i; yi).
Proof: Assume that this is not the case for some z; i; xi; yi. Then we have
ui (xi)  ui (yi) but u0 (z i; xi) < u0 (z i; yi). By Claim 1 we can nd wi 2 Rl++
such that
u0 (z i; xi)  1 < u0 (z i; wi) < u0 (z i; yi)  1
so that
u0 (z i; xi) < u0 (z i; wi) + 1 < u0 (z i; yi)
It follows that (z i; yi) 0 (z i; wi) but it is not the case that (z i; xi) 0 (z i; wi).
By Consistency, this implies that yi i wi but not xi i wi. This, however, is
impossible as the rst preference implies ui (yi) > ui (wi)+i, which implies ui (xi) >
ui (wi) + i, which, in turn, could only hold if xi i wi were the case. 
Claim 3: For every z 2 X, every i  n, and every xi; yi 2 Rl++, if ui (xi) >
ui (yi), then u0 (z i; xi) > u0 (z i; yi).
Proof: Assume that z; i; xi; yi are given with ui (xi) > ui (yi). As image (ui) = R
we can nd wi 2 Rl++ such that
ui (z i; yi) < ui (z i; wi) + i < ui (z i; xi)
so that xi i wi but not yi i wi. By Consistency, (z i; xi) 0 (z i; wi) but not
(z i; yi) 0 (z i; wi). The rst preference implies u0 (z i; xi) > u0 (z i; wi)+ 1 while
the second u0 (z i; yi)  u0 (z i; wi) + 1. Hence u0 (z i; xi) > u0 (z i; yi) follows. 
Claim 4: For every x; y 2 X, if for every i  n, ui (xi)  ui (yi), then u0 (x) 
u0 (y).
Proof: Use Claim 2 inductively. 
Claim 5: There exists a function g : Rn ! R such that for every x 2 X
u0 (x) = g (u1 (x1) ; :::; un (xn)) :
Proof: We need to show that, for every x; y 2 X, if for every i  n, ui (xi) =
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ui (yi), then u0 (x) = u0 (y). This follows from using Claim 4 twice. 
Claim 6: The function g : Rn ! R is strictly monotone.
Proof: This follows from Claims 4 and 5. 
Claim 7: The function g : Rn ! R is continuous.18
Proof: Assume it were not. Then there would be a point of discontinuity
 = (1; :::; n) 2 Rn. In particular, there would be a sequence k 2 Rn for k  1
such that k !k!1  but g
 
k

does not converge to g (). That is, there exists
" > 0 such that there are innitely many ks for which g
 
k

< g () " or there are
innitely many ks for which g
 
k

> g () + ". Assume without loss of generality
that it is the former case, and that g
 
k

< g ()  " holds for every k.
Because image (ui) = R for every i, we can nd xi 2 Rl++ such that ui (xi) = i.
We wish to construct a sequence xki 2 Rl++ for each i such that ui
 
xki

= ki and that
xki !k!1 xi. If such a sequence existed, we would have xk =
 
xk1; :::; x
k
n
 !k!1 x
while
u0
 
xk

= g
 
u1
 
xk1

; :::; un
 
xkn

= g
 
k

< g ()  "
= g (u1 (x1) ; :::; un (xn))  " = u0 (x)  "
for every k, contradicting the continuity of u0.
Consider, then i  n and k  1. Let
Aki =

wi 2 Rl++
ui (w) = ki 	 :
As image (ui) = R, Aki 6= ?. Because ui is continuous, Aki is closed. Hence there
exists a closest point wi 2 Aki to xi. (To see this, choose an arbitrary point wi 2
Aki and consider the intersection of A
k
i with the closed ball around xi of radius
kwi   xik.) Choose such a closest point xki 2 Aki for each i.
We claim that xki converge to xi. Let there be given & > 0. Consider the &-ball
around xi, N& (xi). Due to strict monotonicity, ui obtains some value i < i as well
as some other value i > i on N& (xi), and, by continuity, the range of ui restricted
to N& (xi) contains the entire interval [i; i]. As 
k
i !k!1 i, for large enough ks
ki 2 [i; i] and one need not look beyond N& (xi) to nd a point wi 2 Aki . In other
18See also Lemma 1 (p. 296) in Fleurbaey and Mongin (2016).
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words, for large enough ks, xki 2 N& (xi) and xki !k!1 xi follows. This completes
the proof of continuity of g. 
To complete this part of the proof we wish to show that for every jnd-grid A  X
there exists c 2 R such that, for every x 2 A,
u0 (x) = c+
nX
i=1
1
i
ui (xi) :
To this end we state
Claim 8: For every  2 Rn and every i  n,
g ( + i1i) = g () + 1
(where 1i is the i-th unit vector).
Proof: Consider  2 Rn and xi 2 Rl++ such that ui (xi) = i. Let yi 2 Rl++ be
such that ui (yi) = i+ i. Then it is not the case that yi i xi and, by Consistency,
it is also not the case that (x i; yi) 0 x. Hence, u0 (x i; yi)  u0 (x) + 1 and
g ( + i1i)  g () + 1 follows.
Next, for every k  1, we can pick yki 2 Rl++ be such that ui (yi) = i + i + 1k .
Then yki i xi and, by Consistency again,
 
x i; yki
 0 x, implying u0  x i; yki  >
u0 (x) + 1 and g
 
 +
 
i +
1
k

1i

> g () + 1. By continuity of g, this implies
g ( + i1i)  g () + 1.
Combining the two, g ( + i1i) = g () + 1 follows. 
Claim 9: For every jnd-grid A  X there exists c 2 R such that, for every
x 2 A,
u0 (x) = c+
nX
i=1
1
i
ui (xi) :
Proof: Pick an arbitrary x 2 A to determine the value of c. Consider all the
n points x(i) that are equal to x in all but one coordinate i, and satisfy ui
 
x(i)

=
ui (x) + i. Clearly, we should have u0
 
x(i)

= u0 (x) + 1. Similarly, for a point y(i)
that di¤ers from x only on that coordinate, but has ui
 
y(i)

= ui (x)  i, we have
u0
 
x(i)

= u0 (x)  1. Continue by induction to cover the countable jnd-grid (using
Claim 8 at each step). 
This completes the su¢ ciency of Consistency for the existence of the function
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g with the required properties. We now turn to the converse direction, that is,
the necessity of Consistency. Assume, then, that there exists a strictly monotone,
continuous g : Rn ! R such that for every x 2 X u0 (x) = g (u1 (x1) ; :::; un (xn))
and, for every jnd-grid A  X there exists c 2 R such that, for every x 2 A,
u0 (x) = c+
nX
i=1
1
i
ui (xi) :
To prove Consistency, let there be given i  n, z 2 X and xi; yi 2 Rl++.
We need to show that (z i; xi) 0 (z i; yi) holds i¤ xi i yi. Assume rst that
(z i; xi) 0 (z i; yi). Then u0 ((z i; xi)) > u0 ((z i; yi)) + 1. Consider the jnd-grid
A that contains (z i; xi). Let wi 2 Rl++ be such that ui (wi) = ui (xi)   i, so that
(z i; wi) 2 A. It follows that u0 ((z i; wi)) = u0 ((z i; xi))  1. Note that
u0 ((z i; yi)) < u0 ((z i; xi))  1 = u0 ((z i; wi)) :
By monotonicity of g, this can only hold if
ui (yi) < ui (wi) = ui (xi)  i
and xi i yi follows.
Conversely, if xi i yi holds, we can nd wi 2 Rl++ be such that ui (wi) = ui (xi) 
i > ui (yi) and show that u0 ((z i; wi)) = u0 ((z i; xi))   1 while u0 ((z i; wi)) >
u0 ((z i; yi)) so that u0 ((z i; xi)) 1 > u0 ((z i; yi)) and (z i; xi) 0 (z i; yi) follows.

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